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Democratically consolidated, externally threatened,
and NATO aligned: ﬁnding unexpected deﬁciencies in
civilian control
David Pion-Berlin, Igor Acácio and Andrew Ivey
Department of Political Science, University of California Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
It has long been presumed in the literature that consolidated democracies that face
serious external threats or are NATO-aligned should feature strong, civilian control
institutions and personnel. This study of Israel, India, Taiwan, Spain and Poland
reveals otherwise. Utilizing biographical data compiled by the authors, we
researched civilian personnel within each country’s defence ministry – the
organizational hub of civil-military relations. Rather than ﬁnding evidence of strong
civilian control, what we found instead were ministries with serious deﬁciencies:
they did not have eﬀective power; they failed to engage in defence planning or
provide strategic guidance to the armed forces; they were led by military personnel
and staﬀed by civilian employees not properly qualiﬁed to handle defence aﬀairs. To
explain these discrepancies, we argue that long-standing deﬁcits in civilian expertise
spur the delegation of ministerial defence positions to more knowledgeable oﬃcers.
Comparisons are made with benchmark states that have achieved civilian ministerial
control.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 28 August 2018; Accepted 5 March 2019
KEYWORDS Democracy; consolidation; NATO; civilian control; civil-military relations; military; ministry of
defence; delegation; expertise
Introduction
It is often presumed that the more advanced, developed democratic states in the world
have the most stable civil-military relations (CMR). Oﬃcers are subordinate to civilian
leaders, the proof being that these states have not been subject to military coups.
Though these oﬃcers may disagree with political leadership over the best courses of
action, they and the troops they command will respectfully fall in line and execute
the policies demanded of them. One of the reasons they do so is that they are subject
to long-standing, well institutionalized systems of civilian control which limit their
ability to contest policies they oppose. Consolidated democracies have had longer ges-
tation periods to not only craft good civilian control institutions, but to instil in oﬃcers
stronger norms of compliance.
Consolidated democracies facing serious if not existential security threats from
abroad should have additional advantages in the realm of civilian control of the
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military. According to some scholars, a threatening external security environment
invites a greater unity of purpose, causing soldiers to stand behind their governments
at all costs in the face of a greater peril.1 Moreover, democratic nations that are
members of the NATO alliance should, all else equal, have advantages as well. Not
only is NATO a defensive alliance, formed to prepare against a near-external threat
in the former Soviet Union and now Russia, but its membership requirements also
compel nations to make reforms enhancing democratic civilian control over their
armed forces. Taken separately or combined, democratic consolidation, a high external
threat environment and NATO membership should greatly enhance the prospects for
civilian control. But is that always the case?
This study of ﬁve consolidated or consolidating democracies demonstrates that con-
trary to prevailing wisdom, democratic consolidation, NATO membership and existen-
tial threats from abroad do not provide the context for a strengthened system of civilian
control over the military. These states – Israel, India, Taiwan, Spain and Poland –
should be ideal candidates for the best CMR. Each state is solidly democratic and is
either subject to grave external threats or is a member of NATO. Consequently, we
should ﬁnd very strong civilian control mechanisms in place, especially within the
defence ministries – the core institutions by which governments dictate defence
policy and priorities to the military. While these ﬁve nations do exhibit a few of the
expected traits, we also ﬁnd many serious deﬁciencies, particularly in their ministries
of defence. These deﬁciencies include limits on defence ministerial power and the
absence of well-informed civilians within leadership roles of those agencies. Too
often, the responsibility to craft defence plans, strategy, and policy gets delegated to
military experts. Civilians, for their part, take a hands-oﬀ approach and only sparingly
exercise their oversight powers.
The article will proceed as follows. Theories on civilian control will be analysed, with
attention paid to contextual elements that are thought to have a decisive inﬂuence on
prospects for institutionalized civilian control. We will then search for evidence of
enhanced civilian control within each country’s ministry of defence – the organization
that constitutes the institutional hub of CMR. We then specify what the empirical indi-
cators for stronger civilian control within defence ministries should be. This is followed
by an in-depth investigation into the ﬁve countries to see to what extent they fulﬁl these
enumerated conditions, relying on data compiled by the authors regarding ministerial
personnel, and qualitative survey responses from country experts. Those nations will be
compared to benchmark states – the U.S., the United Kingdom, and France – that are
thought to have strong civilian control systems in place. The article concludes by
putting forth a rival explanation that could account for why so many civilian control
deﬁciencies are present in countries where we would least expect them. We argue
that long-standing deﬁcits in civilian expertise spur the delegation of ministerial
defence positions to more knowledgeable oﬃcers. In the conclusion, some clues are
unearthed from our ﬁve cases, but additional research is warranted to ﬂush out the
alternative account.
Democratic consolidation, external threats and military alliances
Scholars have long studied the conditions for improving civil-military relations and
civilian control within democratic states.2 The notion that soldiers must be subordinate
if governments are to endure and remain stable is now widely accepted. So too is the
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idea that civilian control should be institutionalized. Governments need a longer-term,
structured relation that induces stable, supportive encounters between political oﬃcials
and military personnel. For this, they need formal institutions, which translates into a
set of strong, well-staﬀed, civilian-led organizations that can devise and oversee defence
policies and military operations.3
For these reasons, it is important to pay careful attention to a nation’s ministry of
defence in assessing the robustness of its civilian control. The ministry of defence is,
according to Bruneau and Goetze, indispensable for establishing civilian control. As
they say: “The Ministry of Defense (MOD) structure has become widely viewed as
the best solution to the classic paradox, ‘Who guards the guardians?’”4 These same
authors note that one of the primary purposes of defence ministries is to “structure
the power relationships between democratically elected civilian leaders and the
armed forces command.”5
What conditions would enhance the prospects for strengthened civilian stewardship
and oversight within defence ministries? The causes of civilian control have been
studied extensively, and the explanatory candidates are numerous. One of the more
important ones is the contextual dimension.6 In politics, actors are usually assumed
to be strategic, and their choices matter. Civilian defence specialists within the ministry
can act in calculated ways to enhance their authority over the armed forces. But they
make those choices within an environmental context that either enables or constrains
them. As Croissant et al have explained,
[while] civilian actors can freely choose from the outlined menu of strategies in principle, they
do not decide for or against a certain strategy… in a historical or social vacuum. Rather, civil-
military relations take place within an environmental context that provides resources, opportu-
nities and limits to the civilian’s strategy choices.7
The above authors and others look at political and security environments, examining
how these should “inﬂuence the chances of institutionalizing civilian control.”8 There
are three environments we will focus on: a nation’s democratic system, its external
security environment, and military alliances. It is not coincidental that some of the
strongest civilian control systems reside in the older, more established democratic
nations.9 As the democratic system matures, political leaders, fortiﬁed by stronger
societal support, gain the conﬁdence they need to tackle second-generation problems
of governing the defence and security sectors, where attention turns to state capacity
building.10 In short, a consolidated democracy should help strengthen institutionalized
civilian control measures.
Regarding the external security environment, a few inﬂuential theorists contend that
a menacing threat from abroad is conducive for civilian control.11 The need to prepare
defences against a formidable foreign adversary should forge unity of purpose, meaning
military elites will work with the political authorities, not against them. The military will
demonstrate respect towards civilians who, under conditions of heightened external
security risks, come to the job well prepared in defence and national security aﬀairs
– as they must – if they are to eﬀectively confront a foreign adversary.12 One clear impli-
cation of the theory is that key defence institutions such as ministries should be popu-
lated with capable civilian directors and staﬀers who can demonstrate leadership in the
face of crisis. The risks of not doing so are high.
Likewise NATO countries have a heightened awareness of the perils of defence vul-
nerability. The alliance was forged to contain the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and
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the need for military preparedness has been emphasized ever since. But members must
also commit themselves to strengthening their democratic civilian control systems.
With admission comes greater pressures to conform to the group, and incentives to
abide by NATO standards derived not just from the added security that comes with alli-
ance protection, but from the technological aid and cost-sharing arrangements that help
make defence reforms possible. Many scholars have argued that NATO membership
has been beneﬁcial for fortifying civilian-led defence institutions which subordinate
the military.13 In sum what justiﬁes a theoretical and empirical comparison between
high threat countries and NATO members is the acute awareness of security threats,
the priority attached to preparing strong defences against those threats, the need for
civilians to get better prepared, and the expectation that militaries will be subordinate.
These are contextual conditions that scholars assert should promote better institu-
tionalized civilian control. Any one of these factors should alone be beneﬁcial. We
will stack the deck in favour of the conventional view, analysing countries with two
of these elements present. The studied cases are Israel, India, Taiwan, Spain, and
Poland. All are consolidated or consolidating democracies. Also, the ﬁrst three face exis-
tential external threats, and the ﬁnal two are NATOmembers. If any ﬁve nations should
exhibit strong, institutionalized civilian control systems, these ﬁve should.
The countries under review qualify as strong democracies, though some backsliding
has occurred in Poland in recent years.14 They all moved well beyond transitional stages
years ago and have had uninterrupted competitive rule ever since. They range in age
from 25 to 69 years, with the mean age being 45. Freedom House and Polity IV
scores (Table 1) place them squarely within the democratic category. Israel, India
and Taiwan also face serious external threats. Israel has been at war with neighbouring
states numerous times, has undertaken invasions of Lebanon, and continues to face
security challenges posed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Taiwan and the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) have been at loggerheads for decades. To this day, the PRC does not
recognize Taiwan’s existence as an independent country and remains hostile to any
eﬀorts by it to claim sovereignty. India’s nemesis has long been Pakistan. The two
have gone to war against each other four times (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999) and both
are nuclear powers. Security forces in the disputed territory of Kashmir remain on
heightened alert. Spain and Poland are NATO members. Spain was admitted to
NATO in 1982, and Poland joined NATO in 1999.
Evidence of enhanced ministerial civilian control
These ﬁve nations are democratic, and either face high external threats or are NATO
aligned. We would expect to see solid evidence that defence institutions are in place
that facilitate a democratic government’s control over its armed forces and its
defence policies. In particular, a ministry of defence must be situated in the chain of
operational command, with direct supervisory authority over the armed forces; be
headed by a politically appointed civilian; have a leadership structure dominated by
civilians, along with a sizeable, well-educated and trained civilian staﬀ who carry out
vital functions such as planning and strategizing.
Conversely, the virtues of democratic consolidation, external threat and NATO
membership would be seriously challenged were we to ﬁnd defence ministries that
(a) did not have unambiguous, unchallenged, and direct operational command over
the armed forces; (b) were not equipped to oversee a multitude of key defence
4 D. PION-BERLIN ET AL.
responsibilities; (c) were military-led, with active duty or retired oﬃcers in charge of the
ministry and its departments; (d) had civilian staﬀers without adequate education and
training in defence aﬀairs.
Obviously, there are other indices that could be added to the list. Ministries should
have ample control over the defence budget and oversight on organizational military
aﬀairs (bases, procurement, promotions and appointments, other personnel issues,
etc.). A democratized civil-military relation should have strong legislative defence com-
missions. The inclusion of these variables would expand the study well beyond reason-
able bounds and could more reasonably be the subject of a follow-up study. We are
conﬁdent that the issues that have been included here are among the most essential.
Is the ministry of defence within a singular chain of command?
If a ministry of defence is to carry out policies on behalf of the executive, it must be
situated squarely within an operational chain of command. This is so that a nation’s
political leader can call on his defence minister to faithfully convert his preferences
into orders that are sent down the chain of command to the armed service branches
and their troops. This placement also ensures that the ministry is the agency at the
service of the president’s defence priorities.
The defence ministries in India, Taiwan and Spain are properly situated within the
hierarchy; the ministries in Israel and Poland are not. In Israel, the ministry resides
alongside the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), not above it. The defence minister is in
the direct line of authority below the Prime Minister and just above the military
chief of staﬀ. However, his ministry is oﬀ to the side, pulling no bureaucratic weight.
Institutionally, the IDF and its general staﬀ have more inﬂuence within the political
hierarchy then the ministry of defence itself. Senior oﬃcers have direct access to politi-
cal elites, and the IDF routinely shows up for cabinet meetings, as well the more special-
ized Inter-Ministerial Committee on Defence. While there, it presents its own plans,
without the permission or guidance of the defence minister. Though he is present,
the defence minister does not represent the IDF before the cabinet; the IDF represents
itself. This gives the IDF undue inﬂuence and excessive vertical authority within the pol-
itical structure of the state.
In Poland, there is a dual chain of command that creates an ambiguous, often con-
fusing state of aﬀairs. This is a by-product of Poland’s development as a semi-presiden-
tial system, fuelled by reoccurring rivalry between the President and Prime Minister,
with one line of authority running from the President to the armed forces, while the
other is running from the Prime Minister to his defence minister and on to the
Table 1. Independent variable scores: democracy, external threat and NATO membership.
Israel India Taiwan Spain Poland USA UK France
Democratic Consolidation Age 69 67 25 39 26 208 137 48
FH Scorea 2 2.5 2 1 1.5 1 1 1
Polity Scoreb 7 9 8 10 10 8 10 9
External Threat High High High Low Low Yes Yes Yes
NATO Member No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
aFH = Freedom House Score (2017) combines coding for political rights and civil liberties, ranging 1–7 with 1
being most free.
bPolity Scores (2017) code levels of democracy, ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest and scores of 6–10
qualifying as democracies.
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armed forces. The President and his National Security Bureau (BBN) can at times dom-
inate defence and security policymaking. At other times they are supplanted by the PM
and ministry of defence. This structure has limited the role of the ministry of defence
and has allowed the military to play those two centres of power against each other,
weakening civilian oversight.15
Ministry of defence leadership: is it military or civilian dominated?
Any organizational scheme that does not enhance the position and control of democra-
tically elected oﬃcials and their civilian appointees has failed at one of its principal
tasks.16 This concretely means having nonuniformed personnel in key leadership pos-
itions. The purpose of defence ministries is to prepare the armed forces to serve the
policy goals of government, and not the other way around. Should active duty or
retired military oﬃcers occupy top positions within the defence sector, they may
exhibit divided loyalties. While they are sworn to serve the constitutionally elected gov-
ernment, they are occasionally tempted to betray that oath by obliging the institution
they were part of and loyal to for so many years. Civilianized leaders must be in
place to stand vigilant against eﬀorts to push an armed forces agenda at the expense
of a national agenda.
Even if these military personnel are devoted ﬁrst to serving the government, having
too many in leadership positions could result in the crowding out of alternative points
of view. This results because oﬃcers are often like-minded in their approach to defence,
having been conditioned to adhere to one set of ideas in a hierarchical organization.17
What is most conducive to good defence policymaking is to have some balance of per-
spectives that encourages a vigorous give and take between civilian and military defence
specialists, with the understanding that ultimate policy decisions rest with elected
oﬃcials. But all of this is mute if enough civilians are not in enough positions of auth-
ority to have their voices heard.
Except for Taiwan and Israel all these countries do regularly appoint civilians as
defence ministers. Since the transition to democracy, all of Spain’s defence ministers
have been politically-appointed civilians, as have India’s, while 85% of Poland’s minis-
ters have been civilian. By contrast, 88% of ministers in Taiwan since the transition to
democracy have been active or retired oﬃcers; in Israel it has been 67%.
As far as other leadership positions are concerned, there is a much greater cause for
concern. From deputy ministers on down to department heads, four of these ﬁve
countries have defence ministries dominated by soldiers. As shown in Table 2, the
number of military heads exceed civilian heads in every case except India. If we were
to exclude the mandatory military MOD positions from the count, even then a minority
of leadership positions are staﬀed by civilians in Israel and Taiwan, with Spain showing
an even split. We know these civilian proportions are low, as we can compare them to
benchmark states – ones long regarded as models of civilian control. As shown in
Table 2, in the United States, The United Kingdom, and France, the average civilian lea-
dership presence within the defence ministries (or its equivalent) is 87% (excluding
necessary military posts).
The Polish number of 67.9% must be taken with a grain of salt. Though a majority of
the ministry’s 18 departments are listed as having civilian heads, appearances may be
deceiving. Some experts have concluded that most of the personnel listed as civilian
were actually military – many of them retirees changing into civilian apparel.18 It is
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active duty oﬃcers who dominate most of the directorates within the Polish Ministry of
National Defence (MoND),19 reﬂecting a serious imbalance in the ratio of military to
civilian staﬀ, as there is with Israel, Taiwan and Spain.
The results of our analysis on MOD leadership in Spain are surprising, considering
how much progress had been made in other respects. The MOD leadership is largely
militarized. In 2018, out of 46 positions listed as “defence leadership,” 80.4% are occu-
pied by retired or active-duty military oﬃcers, leaving 19.6% of posts for civilians, indi-
cating a reversal of a trend pointed out by a 1990s study of the Spanish case.20 In 2018,
there were at least 10 positions that could have been occupied by civilians and were
headed by military oﬃcers instead. These include the Secretary-General of Defence
Policy – who is the deputy minister, Director of infrastructure and equipment, the
Director of the CSEDN (Center for National Defence Studies), and many other
deputy posts.
Are defence ministries involved in defence planning?
The Israeli MOD does very little in the way of actual defence planning. It is the IDF’s
Planning and Policy Directorate that handles this.21 In fact, there seems to be a near
monopoly on planning by the IDF.22 The IDF – not the ministry – has real authority
on other matters as well, including military size and structure, intelligence-gathering,
training, doctrine, logistics and personnel.23
In India, Huntington’s division of civil-military labour is taken to extremes. Civilians
leave the military alone to formulate their own plans, while barring the military from
accessing key political ﬁgures or participating in government-level decisions. The
MOD provides no guidance to the armed forces who chart their own course of
action based on their own doctrines. The military-developed “Cold Start” doctrine,
for instance, relies on the quick thinking of regional commanders along India’s
Table 2. Civilian vs. military leadership in the defence ministry.
Attribute Israel India Taiwan Spain Poland USA UK France
Total MOD leadership 24 47 28 46 41 127 23 35
Number of necessarily military positionsa 0 9 11 28 13 37 7 14
Number of military personnel 17 13 23 37 22 67 7 16
Number of civilian personnel 7 34 5 9 19 60 16 19
% Civilian (including necessarily military
positions)
29.2 72.3 17.9 19.6 46.3 47.2 69.6 54.3
% Civilian (excluding necessarily military
positions)
29.2 89.5 29.4 50.0 67.9b 66.7 100 90.5
Note: Military = Active Duty + Retired Military Personnel.
Sources: Original dataset compiled by the authors. It is available from the authors upon request. The dataset was
compiled using oﬃcial MOD sources, oﬃcial gazettes, and government transparency websites. If the individual
proﬁles of leaders were not available on oﬃcial government websites, they were checked online in local press
outlets and professional network websites such as LinkedIn and local Wikipedia (while verifying additional
sources).
The list of most heavily used websites is as follows: Israel (http://www.mod.gov.il/), India (https://mod.gov.in/,
http://www.spsmilitaryyearbook.com, and https://www.indianbureaucracy.com), Taiwan (https://www.mnd.
gov.tw/), Spain (http://www.defensa.gob.es/ and http://transparencia.gob.es/), and Poland (http://en.mon.
gov.pl/); US: https://dod.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Senior-Defense-Oﬃcials/; UK: https://www.gov.uk/
government/people; https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence; France: https://www.
defense.gouv.fr/.
aPositions occupied only by military personnel within the defence ministry, such as chief of staﬀ, deputy chief of
staﬀ or army, navy and air force commanders.
bThis number may overstate the civilian presence. See text below for explanations.
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border with Pakistan.24 Under this doctrine, local commanders have the autonomy to
determine when escalation is necessary and at what level.25 Clear civilian direction and
oversight is missing, and planning is left entirely to the service branches.26
And in Poland, the MoND does not do any military planning. That function is
reserved for the military General Staﬀ, while the MoND does something called “non-mili-
tary planning.” This is not tantamount to defence, and it is unclear to one well-informed
scholar exactly what it is.27 What is clear is that some of the most important national
defence documents have emanated from the National Security Bureau (BBN), including
the 2012 National Strategic Security Review, the 2013 White Book on National Security,
and the 2014 National Security Strategy for Poland. Arguably, the MoND should have at
the very least, collaborated on these documents. Thomas-Durell Young says, “They [civi-
lians in the MoND] don’t really have the authority to do defence planning nor do they
have access to ﬁnancial data-bases from which they could plan.”28 The armed forces
have kept important data close to the cuﬀ, often barring civilians from gaining access.
Do civilians provide the military with strategic guidance?
Military plans, whether in peacetime or war, should be drawn up with strategic gui-
dance in mind, provided by civilians in the democratically elected government. A mili-
tary plan without strategic guidance behind it is akin to aiming blindly. Military plans
only make sense if they fulﬁl defence plans which in turn derive from an overarching
security strategy developed at the highest political levels. Defence ministers and their
staﬀ convert national security strategies into defence policies that will guide military
action. And yet, many civilians do not provide their militaries with such guidance.
In Israel, the Defence Force (IDF) formulates its own strategic objectives, without the
beneﬁt of governmental input. The IDF is “considered the only reliable, professional
and objective source of information and policy recommendation.”29 Israeli politicians
and civilian defence oﬃcials from the MOD come to the table woefully unprepared.
In India, the military conduct operations without strategic guidance from the govern-
ment. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta refer to this as “arming without aiming.”30
There is a total absence of dialogue between government civilians and the military, and
this impairs eﬀectiveness. There is a noticeable lack of well qualiﬁed civilian defence
specialists within MoND in Poland. Those pure civilians that reside in the non-military
planning directorates of the ministry are more akin to administrators, and do not
provide any strategic guidance for the armed forces.
In Taiwan, the MOD does provide strategic guidance, but this is handled bymilitary
personnel – not civilians. The latter are largely relegated to administrative and other
non-critical tasks.31 Lastly, in Spain, the formulation of defence strategy occurs
within the National Security Council which answers to the government’s Council of
Ministers.32 Such formulation does not occur in the MOD, which suﬀers from a
harmful trickle-down eﬀect from political party elites who either think civilian expertise
is unnecessary given the ample supply of knowledgeable military personnel, or who
show limited interest in defence matters.33 These prejudices seep down to the MOD,
creating civilian qualiﬁcation problems.
Are civilians within MOD well educated in defence aﬀairs?
It is not enough to simply bring civilians into an MOD. If they are to perform valuable
leadership functions, they should come to the job with expertise in hand. It is not likely
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that civilians will ever achieve perfect parity with the military on defence wisdom, nor is
that necessary.34 Instead, civilians must have suﬃcient expertise to quiet military appre-
hensions and contribute constructively to the crafting of policy. For this to occur, there
must be ample educational opportunities availed to civilian candidates within univer-
sities and other research outlets. Then there must be a merit-based selection process
such as a career track that ties educational institutions to the government, facilitating
the recruitment of highly trained graduates. If not, then ministries often rely on the
state civil service system or political appointees to ﬁnd staﬀers. While these individuals
may have general knowledge and solid administrative skills, they are usually not trained
in defence or security aﬀairs.35
Israel’s civilian community of defence experts – outside of government – is large and
very well informed. The country has an established programme in National Security
Studies at the University of Haifa and a research Institute for National Security
Studies at Tel-Aviv University. ten faculty are associated with the former, and some
80 researchers with the latter.36 However, few of them make their way into the
MOD. For example, of the 39 senior directors and researchers at Tel-Aviv’s Institute
for National Security Studies, only ﬁve have had any association with the MOD in
their entire careers, and all of those are former high-ranking oﬃcers. 56% of the
researchers at the Institute are civilians, but none have held any positions within the
MOD.37 As of 2018, none of the civilian MOD top leadership has any association
with those two programmes, nor does it have any background in national security or
defence aﬀairs.
In India, civilians within MOD are bureaucrats, chosen either from the India
Administrative Service (IAS) or its Central Secretariat Service (CSS). These are
federal agencies that test aspiring applicants interested in defence on “general ability”
(or knowledge), English, and math, not speciﬁc understandings of defence or security.38
Taiwanese civilians who staﬀ the MOD are administrative civil servants who come to
the job without defence education or training. Eﬀorts to allow better-trained civilians
in by circumventing the civil service were blocked by the civilian bureaucracy itself.
As David Kuehn argues, that reinforced the military’s view that defence policymaking
best be left in the hands of the military, since bureaucrats are not interested in attracting
a skilled work force.39 Taiwan does have a few think tanks, associations (e.g. the Chinese
Strategy Study Association) and university research centres (National Chengchi Univer-
sity’s Center for Security Studies) focused on military and defence issues. While they
produce excellent scholars, those scholars are seldom recruited by the MOD.
The central problem in Spain seems to be a lack of career opportunities for civilians
in defence,40 and few opportunities to get on the job training.41 Of all civilian employees
in the MOD, only 32% have joined the government as a career choice (estatutarios or
funcionarios).42 There are centres dedicated to the study of defence such as the Instituto
Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado or the Center for National Defence Studies, but
out of the 2424 faculty members hired by the MOD and the branches of the armed
forces, only 150 or 6% are civilians.43 At the Center for National Defence Studies, 67
individuals are listed as faculty members, but none of these are civilians.44 Instead,
these opportunities are seized by military oﬃcers who want to boost their CVs.45
The few civilians who graduate from these programmes are rarely recruited to work
for the MOD.46
Finally, there are Polish universities that teach “strategic studies” of a sort and
knowledge producing think tanks produce ﬁrst-rate analysts. The military academic
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institutions are open to civilian students. The diﬃculty is that those well-trained ana-
lysts do not ﬁnd their way into government. There is no carefully devised plan to
recruit and retain civilians. Moreover, there are not only stiﬀer qualiﬁcation require-
ments for civilians than military, but also poorer salaries and beneﬁts than for
oﬃcers. As a result, many civilian defence specialists prefer to ﬁrst enter the military,
and only then seek staﬃng positions within the ministry as oﬃcers.47
As shown in Table 3, these ﬁve democratically advanced states, facing serious exter-
nal threats or having joined NATO, have failed to establish suﬃciently strong, civilian
populated defence ministries. None of the countries fulﬁl all the conditions, while only
Spain and India fulﬁl half of the conditions. Even in the older democracies, with long
traditions of military subordination, such as Israel and India, civilians not only fail to
provide general strategic guidance to their armed forces, but they by and large do
not participate in the crafting of defence related policies. Instead they delegate these
key tasks to the military, or do not object should the armed forces assume these respon-
sibilities for themselves.
By contrast, evidence suggests that our benchmark cases – The United States, the
United Kingdom and France – have established a robust, civilian presence within
their respective defence ministries (see Tables 2 and 3). As shown in Table 2, the pro-
portion of leadership positions assumed by civilian personnel in those benchmark states
is substantially higher than that found in four of the ﬁve other countries. Probing
beneath the surface we can further discriminate between civilians who are in charge
of strategic (essential) vs. non-strategic tasks. The former refer to all those involved
in the development of defence policy, planning, strategy, doctrine – all directly
related to the application of force. The latter refer to those in the supportive areas of
administration, ﬁnance, legal aﬀairs, personnel, etc. Of the 60 civilians in top positions
within the U.S. Department of Defense in 2018, 37 (61%) were in essential, strategic
positions, and 23 in non-strategic positions. In the U.K., ten of sixteen civilians
(62.5%) were in those essential, strategically relevant positions. And in France, 12 of
19 (63%) civilian personnel in the ministry of defence are in those same key positions.
Thus, almost two-thirds of the civilians in the top echelons of the benchmark state
defence ministries not only have a bureaucratic presence but hold positions that are
vital to the conduct of warfare.48
In addition, the benchmark states can draw on broad pools of civilian talent from the
outside to inform defence policymaking on the inside. Of the United States, Thomas
Bruneau has written,
Table 3. Ministry of defence (MOD): indicators of strength.
Israel India Taiwan Spain Poland USA UK France
MOD in a singular, operational chain of
command?
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
MOD minister a civilian? Yes Yes No Yes Yes Noa Yes Yes
MOD leadership mostly civilian? No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
MOD does defence planning? No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
MOD civilians provide strategic guidance to
the military?
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
MOD civilians suﬃciently educated in
defence?
No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Strength Indicators Fulﬁlled 1/6 3/6 2/6 3/6 1/6 5/6 6/6 6/6
aTrue during the tenure of General James N. Mattis as SECDEF (2017–2018), who has since stepped down.
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[it] is possible to write with conﬁdence that by far larger sectors of US civil society and the media
follow, investigate, and seek to inﬂuence policy on issues of national security and defence, than
in any other country in the world.49
Likewise, France has a strong pool of civilian experts, bringing in experts from a broad
sector of society, including civilian academics in crafting defence strategy, procurement
and expenditures.50 In the United Kingdom, parliament and civilian experts outside of
government take part in the planning, overseeing and implementation of overseas
operations.51
To sum up, clearly democratic consolidation will not account for disparities in civi-
lian control since the bench mark states do well while the other democracies do not. If
the process of strengthening democratic norms and practices had a positive impact on
civilian presence within defence ministries, it should have showed up in all eight
countries under review. Moreover, neither membership in NATO nor high-levels of
threat can account for the remarkable and unexpected deﬁciencies in civilian knowledge
and ministerial control we encountered. Rather than discovering strong ministries
populated with civilian experts commanding leadership positions, we encounter minis-
tries either without teeth or dominated by retired and active duty military oﬃcers. The
following section will explore an alternative explanation for why the more positive out-
comes have not materialized.
A rival explanation: knowledge deﬁcits, path dependence, and
delegation
We surmise that what connects late-NATO joiners (Spain and Poland) with nations
facing existential threats (Israel, India and Taiwan) are not only the obvious security
concerns they all share, but also the presence of wide gaps between military and civilian
expertise.
Numerous scholars concur that civilians must demonstrate some competence in
defence and security aﬀairs if they are to assume leadership roles.52 Clausewitz
himself said that “[a] certain grasp of military aﬀairs is vital for those in charge of
general policy.”53 Knowledge confers authority on leaders, translating directly into
decision-making inﬂuence. But for nations whose civilians have serious and persistent
knowledge deﬁcits, governments will be motivated to delegate key tasks to their more
informed armed forces personnel. Why is this so?
NATO puts a premium on defence readiness, assuring that aspiring members
improve their military capabilities as the price for admission. Aspirants must commit
to developing forces that are fully capable of contributing to collective defence and par-
ticipating in the full range of NATO missions.54 Aspirants must adopt new norms of
defence as designed by the older founding members of NATO. Not to adapt could
result in membership denial, not to mention the loss of economic and technological
beneﬁts that would derive from being accepted into the “club.”55 Once enrolled in
NATO, there are pressures to maintain standards and readiness so that members can
productively participate in NATO missions.
By contrast, NATO demands for improved civilian control are quite vague, with no
penalties for non-compliance.56 NATO’s Membership Action Plans, devised for each
aspirant, only say that prospective members should “establish appropriate democratic
and civilian control of their armed forces.”57 Nowhere is there a rubric set out as to
how they should set up their defence ministries, whether it should be civilian-led,
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what the ratio should be between military and civilian staﬀ personnel, or what level of
expertise is required among civilians who work at the ministry. Once in, new members
can do as much or as little as they wish, and there are no provisions for either sanction-
ing or expelling members for non-compliance.58
Accordingly, late-joining nations, pressured into enhancing their defence readiness,
prepare their soldiers by enrolling them in academic programmes designed to improve
their knowledge of defence and taking advantage of NATO’s own education and train-
ing programmes.59 But there was less need for governments to invest in civilian defence
education and training, and who could instead, free ride on the accumulated wisdom of
soldiers. As a consequence, late-joining nations have seen the knowledge-gap between
civilians and militaries actually widen with the passage of time.60 In this scenario, it is
inviting for governments to delegate more and more defence ministerial functions to
oﬃcers.
A related phenomenon occurs in those non-NATO countries which face existential
threats. In Israel, India and Taiwan, grave risks emerged very early in the nation-build-
ing process and have remained with those nations ever since. Taiwan inherited the
Chinese threat as a legacy of Chiang-Kai-Shek’s retreat from the mainland in 1949.
Israel immediately entered a geopolitical environment where it was surrounded by
hostile states, as did India. In the instance of border incursions, missile strikes, and
even threats of invasion from a hostile neighbouring state, there is little time for delib-
eration, or margin for error. Mistakes are costly, and those with greater defence wisdom
are less likely to make mistakes, all else equal.
In such circumstances, we argue that incentives to delegate assignments and pos-
itions to the military are quite high. If military oﬃcers are more knowledgeable on
defence in such circumstances, then civilians concerned with preserving the nation in
the face of existential perils will see delegation as not only beneﬁcial, but essential.
This is especially true when deﬁcits in civilian expertise are sizeable and long-standing,
as they have been in our cases (see the conclusion below). To overcome those deﬁcits
would take a considerable amount of time, and time is a resource in short supply for
nations facing serious external threats.
Certainly, a benchmark state like the United States faced existential perils of its own.
But the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the fear of nuclear conﬂagration prompted
civilians to invest very early on in nuclear defence expertise.61 By the early 1960s, the
U.S. had assembled a team of civilian defence planners and strategists who “exerted
their authority [over the military] with vigor.”62 Civilians maintained their level of
expertise for the duration of the ColdWar and beyond. There was much less of a knowl-
edge gap, and thus less need to delegate defence planning and strategizing to the gen-
erals, out of fear that the nation would be unprepared to confront its adversaries.
In both sets of countries, a path-dependent process is set in motion.63 Military
oﬃcers are better prepared, making delegation of ministerial positions to them enticing.
The more tasks that are delegated, the more ownership the military assumes over its
newfound duties, allowing it to lock in advantages by claiming only it has the where-
withal to carry out the defence tasks it has been assigned.64 The longer this goes on,
the more diﬃcult it becomes for civilians to claw back positions and duties they had
given away. The military’s accumulation of expertise makes it increasingly implausible
that civilians could ever catch up, especially if knowledge gaps were sizeable to begin
with. There does not exist a set of incentives strong enough to induce governments
to close the gap by supplying the institutional resources to invest in training an
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entire cadre of civilian defence specialists. Instead, those governments would rather
invest their scarce resources in other pursuits.65
Conclusion
This study suggests that to be democratically consolidated, externally threatened or
NATO aligned will not individually or jointly suﬃce to induce institutionalized civilian
control. What our rival explanation suggests instead is the need for additional research
into the conditions under which early deﬁcits in civilian understanding of defence may
have put some nations on a path-dependent track towards military domination over
defence policy and defence ministerial posts.
For instance, Israel’s military had long ago established a ﬁrm reputation for battleﬁ-
eld prowess and strategic acumen, earning for itself unrivalled status. But this was
reinforced by the turn of the new century, when the asymmetric war with Palestinians
posed unforeseen challenges, prompting the generals to devise new modes of strategic
thinking to counter the perceived threat. The military became, according to Kobi
Michael, “epistemic authorities” on asymmetric conﬂict while civilians never
mounted their own knowledge-building eﬀort.66 This widened the knowledge gap
between military and political echelons, allowing the former to dominate which in
turn weakened civilian control on an institutional level.
In India, as early as 1951, civilians in the ministry of defence proved unresponsive to
military requests for direction.67 Though civilians had oﬃcial control, they had no
expertise in defence or security to draw on, which hampered their ability to communi-
cate with their oﬃcers, let alone provide any strategic guidance to them.68 That lack of
guidance led to the creation a law in 1958 that not only enshrined military autonomy
but went so far as to grant legal impunity for soldiers operating in emergency zones
(article 6).69 This has been the state of aﬀairs ever since.
Like many other members of the former Eastern bloc, Poland’s military remained
subordinate to civilian principals immediately after the transition to democratic rule.
But in conformity with the old Soviet penetration model, those principals knew how
to enforce political-ideological control but lacked any knowledge of defence and secur-
ity aﬀairs. As a consequence, they preferred to delegate responsibilities to oﬃcers while
letting the military reform itself – a pattern which has persisted to this day.70 In Taiwan,
military ﬁgures held important posts within the Kuomintang (KMT) Party that ruled
the nation for decades, and they enjoyed autonomy in the making and implementation
of defence policy.71 An over-reliance on oﬃcers to hold down key policy positions ever
since has been traced to a “lack of civilian experts qualiﬁed to assume these positions,”
according to M. Taylor Fravel.72
Finally, in Spain, civilians had to play catch up with military experts. According to
Narcis Serra, at the time of the transition, civilian political parties were only just begin-
ning to study defence and security issues.73 But as mentioned before, at those centres
currently dedicated to the production of defence knowledge, very few of the faculty
and students are civilians. Hence, the civilian defence knowledge deﬁcits persist.
These are but small, tantalizing clues to as to why civilian control deﬁcits loom large
in countries where we might not expect it. More research will be needed to determine
the exact causal mechanisms that lead our countries down a path toward weaker civilian
control. All of this is not to suggest that external threats or NATO membership are irre-
levant, but rather that they inﬂuence outcomes in an unexpected direction. Where a
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very high premium is placed on defence readiness, as it is for these ﬁve high threat/and
NATO cases, then it is essential that knowledgeable ministerial personnel be in place. If
civilians come to the job unprepared, and do not have the proper incentives to over-
come their knowledge deﬁcits, then more capable oﬃcers will stand ready to ﬁll the
gap. Delegation of ministerial positions to the military will result, and civilian control
will suﬀer as a consequence.
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